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Failure to Contribute: An Estimate of the Consequences of Non- and
Underpayment of Self-Employment Taxes by Independent Contractors and
On-Demand Workers on Social Security
Caroline Lewis Bruckner and Thomas L. Hungerford *
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Over the past ten years, companies such as Uber, Etsy, Lyft, Airbnb, Care,
and Rover have become household names by connecting service providers and
sellers with consumers online and through app-based programs. This work
continues to grow, along with the technology-enabled convenience of accessing goods
and services through apps on smartphones in this new sector of the economy
(hereinafter “On-Demand Economy”). While self-employed workers, independent
contractors, freelancers, and contingent workers have long been present in
America’s workforce, the proliferation of companies that connect sellers and service
providers with customers and process payment online and via apps (hereinafter
“On-Demand Platforms”), as well as the increasing prevalence of cashless
transactions for work on demand, has raised important questions as to how
efficiently our current tax collection system works.
While existing research has focused on the size, growth trajectory, and labor
law implications of the On-Demand Economy, as well as the tax, compliance, and
benefits issues triggered by the rise of its workforce, less academic work has been
devoted to quantifying the Social Security implications of the On-Demand Economy
and its workers. Although it is not new that the self-employed present tax
compliance and income reporting issues, the existing reporting rules applicable to
most workers earning income working with On-Demand Platforms substantially
increase the likelihood that these taxpayers will fail to contribute to Social Security
and Medicare through payment of Self-Employment (SE) tax. This article sheds
light on the Social Security implications of the current federal tax rules for the selfemployed generally, and in particular, workers earning income through occupations
occurring in the On-Demand Economy through estimating the population and
earnings of these workers using data from the U.S. Census Bureau redesigned
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).
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By analyzing 2014 SIPP data, we are able to identify populations of (1) selfemployed, non-employer respondents working outside of a traditional employment
relationship (hereinafter “Independent Contractors”); and (2) individuals who work
in occupations that occur in the On-Demand Economy (hereinafter “On-Demand
Workers”). SIPP data has the potential to capture workers earning income using
On-Demand Platforms to connect with customers and process payment (hereinafter
“On-Platform Workers”) as well as workers earning income in occupations occurring
in the On-Demand Economy not using On-Demand Platforms (hereinafter “OffPlatform Workers”).
Additionally, with SIPP data, we can estimate the earnings that Independent
Contractors and On-Demand Workers earned in 2014. Then, using existing Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) data on the tax gap, U.S. Treasury audit data specific to the
underpayment of SE tax as well as survey data of tax compliance of On-Platform
Workers and the self-employed, we are able to create an estimate of how much SE
tax should have been paid on this income but likely was not. To provide context for
our findings, we developed estimates on the likely underpayment of SE tax from
data published by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics in 2018 on the number of
Independent Contractors and On-Platform Workers from data published by the U.S.
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration in 2017 and 2019. In addition,
using SIPP, we were able to provide demographic data on Independent Contractors
and On-Demand Workers, not typically derived from tax data. Ultimately, we found
that:
•
•
•

•

•

According to SIPP, approximately 7.1 million individuals were Independent
Contractors, and 3.12 million individuals were On-Demand Workers in 2014.
Using SIPP data, we estimate the collective earnings of Independent
Contractors were approximately $204.1 billion 2014, while On-Demand
Workers collectively earned approximately $35.97 billion in 2014.
Based on our review of SIPP data and existing measures of misreporting selfemployment income, we estimate at least 3.1 million Independent
Contractors underreported self-employment income in 2014. This
underreporting would result in approximately $4.84 billion in unpaid SE tax,
with approximately $3.92 billion constituting non-payment of Social Security
contributions.
Using SIPP as well as existing research on tax compliance and information
reporting for On-Platform workers and the self-employed, we estimate that
there is as much as $2.51 billion in unpaid SE tax by On-Demand Workers in
2014. This discrepancy translates to approximately $2.03 billion not paid into
Social Security in 2014.
In terms of demographics, using SIPP, we found that Independent
Contractors in 2014 were most often Baby Boomers (that is, aged 55 and
over), more likely to be women than men, and are more often White than a
member of any other race or ethnicity. On-Demand Workers in 2014 were
more often a member of Generation X (that is, aged 34 to 54), more likely to
be women than men, and were most frequently White.
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Our estimates of likely additional SE tax owed by the populations we
identified is attributable, in part, to current information-reporting rules and
directly undermines efforts to fund Social Security. Further, failure to
contribute owed SE tax by these populations could translate to lower Social
Security benefits for these workers upon retirement. While our estimates are
illustrative rather than definitive, they are intended to highlight the
immediate need for (1) additional research on the tax compliance of these
workers and (2) legislative action to combat extensive underreporting of SE
tax by these populations.
Since 2016, Congress, the U.S. Department of Treasury (Treasury), and the
IRS have been aware of tax compliance challenges triggered by the current
information reporting regime with respect to the On-Demand Platform
workers. In addition, since at least 2007, the Treasury and IRS have been
aware of the widespread underreporting of SE taxes and its impact on the tax
gap. With the advent of the On-Demand Economy and its workforce, these
problems have exponentially grown notwithstanding efforts to increase tax
compliance through additional information reporting.

We conclude that policymakers should move forward with considering proposals
targeted to increase tax compliance and Social Security contributions for
Independent Contractors generally, and, in particular, for the On-Demand Economy
workforce. We suggest that Congress can take steps to modernize information
reporting, to update quarterly estimated payment requirements, and to require
distribution of tax guidance to help combat underreporting of self-employment
income and support the solvency of Social Security.
INTRODUCTION
In the past ten years, companies like Uber, Etsy, Lyft, Airbnb, and Rover
have become household names by connecting service providers, sellers, and
consumers online and through app-based programs that users download to their
smartphones (the On-Demand Economy or Gig Economy). 1 The most comprehensive
banking industry data show that, in recent years, at least 2.3 million Americans
each month earned income by renting rooms, giving rides, running errands, and
selling goods using an app-based platform. 2 In fact, as many as 5.5 million
1

2

CAROLINE BRUCKNER, KOGOD TAX POLICY CTR., KOGOD SCH. OF BUS., SHORTCHANGED: THE TAX COMPLIANCE
CHALLENGES OF SMALL BUSINESS OPERATORS DRIVING THE ON-DEMAND PLATFORM ECONOMY 1 (2016),
https://www.american.edu/kogod/research/upload/shortchanged.pdf.
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. INST., THE ONLINE PLATFORM ECONOMY IN 2018: DRIVERS, WORKERS, SELLERS, AND
LESSORS 2–3 (2018), https://www.jpmorganchase.com/content/dam/jpmc/jpmorgan-chase-andco/institute/pdf/institute-ope-2018.pdf [hereinafter JPMCI 2018 STUDY]. The findings reflect data from a
sample of 39 million Chase checking accounts that tracked payments from 128 online platforms to 2.3
million families from October 2012 to March 2018. Id. at 2. In the study, the online platforms, which
connect customers to sellers or service providers and mediate payment, were grouped into four categories:
transportation (driving goods or people); non-transport (dog walking, home care, home repair, telemedicine,
etc.); selling through an online marketplace; and leasing (renting homes, parking spaces, and other assets).
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households earn income from the On-Demand Economy every year. 3 This sector of
the economy continues to grow, along with the convenience of accessing goods and
services through apps on smartphones. 4 In fact, the payroll industry stakeholders
are banking on it. For example, in February 2020, the ADP Research Institute
conducted a study that reviewed the anonymized, aggregated payroll data from
more than 75,000 large companies with more than 18 million workers; it found that
from 2010 to 2019 “the share of gig workers in companies has increased from 14.2%
to 16.4%, a 2.2 percentage point increase, or 15%.” 5
Although independent contractors have been a long-standing feature of the
U.S. workforce, paid work facilitated by online platforms that connect customers
with sellers and service providers and process payment electronically (hereinafter
“On-Demand Platforms”) are a common strategy for workers to earn income outside
of traditional work arrangements, with the supplemental income being “a luxury for
some but a necessity for others.” 6 Some industry research suggests that workers are
looking to the On-Demand Economy as a means of supplementing their retirement
savings and to “age in place.” 7
As the use of On-Demand Platforms has grown, academic research and
policymakers have begun to consider the tax compliance challenges and federal tax

3
4

5

6
7

Id.; see also DIANA FARRELL & FIONA GREIG, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. INST., PAYCHECKS, PAYDAYS, AND THE
ON-DEMAND PLATFORM ECONOMY: BIG DATA ON INCOME VOLATILITY (2016) [hereinafter JPMCI 2016 Study],
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/content/dam/jpmc/jpmorgan-chase-and-co/institute/pdf/jpmc-institutevolatility-2-report.pdf.
JPMCI 2018 STUDY, supra note 2, at 23.
Id. In fact, MBO Partners, a tax and accounting firm focused on the independent workforce that has
produced an annual study of the size of the independent workforce since 2010, estimating that there were
41.1 million independent workers in 2019, a slight decline from the previous year, due to a strong labor
market and the exit of “reluctant independents” (that is, workers who would prefer traditional employment
from independent work). MBO PARTNERS, THE STATE OF INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA 2–3 (2019),
https://s29814.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/MBO-SOI-2019.pdf [hereinafter MBO 2019 REPORT].
However, the study also noted the extraordinary growth of “occasional independents” (that is, workers who
do sporadic or irregular independent contract work like Uber drivers) increased by more than 6% to more
than 15 million (up from 14.1 million in 2018) and more than 40% since 2016. Id. at 6–7; see also
MICROECONOMIX, THE APP ECONOMY IN THE UNITED STATES: A REVIEW OF THE MOBILE APP MARKET AND ITS
CONTRIBUTION TO THE UNITED STATES ECONOMY 19 (2018),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2018/08/ftc-2018-0048-d-0121-155299.pdf
(finding that the app economy in 2018 represented $339.6 billion in direct economic impact).
ADP RESEARCH INST., ILLUMINATING THE SHADOW WORKFORCE: INSIGHTS INTO THE GIG WORKFORCE IN
BUSINESS 3 (2020), https://www.adp.com/-/media/adp/resourcehub/pdf/adpri/illuminating-the-shadowworkforce-by-adp-research-institute.ashx. Additionally, the Freelancers Union and Upwork, as part of their
annual series of reports on freelancing in America, found that 57 million Americans (or 35% of the
workforce) freelanced, which was up from 53 million in 2014. Press Release, Upwork, Sixth Annual
“Freelancing in America” Study Finds That More People than Ever See Freelancing as a Long-Term Career
Path (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.upwork.com/press/2019/10/03/freelancing-in-america-2019/ [hereinafter
FIA 2019 Report].
Aaron Smith, Gig Work, Online Selling and Home Sharing, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 17, 2016),
www.pewinternet.org/2016/11/17/gig-work-online-selling-and-home-sharing.
AIRBNB, AIRBNB'S GROWING COMMUNITY OF 60+ WOMEN HOSTS 8–9 (2016), https://www.airbnbcitizen.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/03/Airbnb_60_Plus_Women_Report.pdf [hereinafter AIRBNB, WOMEN HOSTS]; AIRBNB,
AIRBNB’S GROWING ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES FOR D.C. SENIORS 2 (2018), https://www.airbnbcitizen.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/03/REPORT_-Senior-Airbnb-Hosts-in-D.C.-March-2018-1.pdf [hereinafter AIRBNB,
D.C. SENIORS] (noting the typical D.C. senior host made $10,600 renting their home to D.C. visitors).
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policy implications of service providers and sellers earning income in the OnDemand Economy. 8 For example, in July 2018, the U.S. Senate Committee on
Finance heard testimony indicating that the current tax rules for reporting income
for On-Demand Economy earnings virtually ensure that more taxpayers will
misreport their income and be exposed to audits and penalties. 9 In fact, IRS
taxpayer data confirm these consequences to a certain degree. According to a 2017
analysis prepared by The Wall Street Journal, “the number of filers penalized for
underpaying estimated taxes rose nearly 40% between 2010-2015—to 10 million.” 10
Not only do the tax compliance challenges of these taxpayers result in
widespread underreporting, penalties, and audit exposure for income taxes but
these challenges also implicate the Social Security and Medicare taxes due on selfemployment income (“SE tax”). Failure to properly report income and pay SE tax
undermines Social Security solvency and can reduce workers’ future Social Security
retired-worker benefits that are calculated based on a worker’s “average indexed
monthly earnings.” 11 Social Security is a “self-financing program” that is funded
primarily by payroll taxes paid by covered workers and employers in addition to SE
taxes paid by self-employed individuals. 12
While there is private and academic research reviewing the size, growth
trajectory, and labor law implications of the On-Demand Economy—as well as the
income tax, compliance, and benefits issues triggered by its workers—less emphasis
has been placed on quantifying the SE tax and Social Security implications of the
fact that a significant number of these taxpayers either underreport or fail to remit
8

9

10

11

12

See BRUCKNER, supra note 1; see also Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Can Sharing Be Taxed?, 93 WASH. U. L.
REV. 989, 989 (2016) [hereinafter Can Sharing Be Taxed?]; Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, The Tax Lives of
Uber Drivers: Evidence from Internet Discussion Forums, COLUM. J. TAX L., 1 (2017); Kathleen DeLaney
Thomas, Taxing the Gig Economy, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1415, 1415 (2018); Targeted Tax Reform: Solutions to
Relieve the Tax Compliance Burdens for America’s Small Businesses: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Small
Bus. and Entrepreneurship, 114th Cong. 64–70 (2015) (statement of Caroline Bruckner Executive-inResidence, Accounting and Taxation and Managing Director, Kogod Tax Policy Center); The Sharing
Economy: A Taxing Experience for New Entrepreneurs Part I: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Small Bus.,
114th Cong. 4–6 (2016) (statement of Caroline Bruckner), https://smallbusiness.house.gov/uploadedfiles/524-16_bruckner_testimony_.pdf; [hereinafter The Sharing Economy: Part I] Small Business Tax Reform:
Modernizing the Code for the Nation’s Job Creators: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 115th
Cong. 10–23 (2017) (statement of Caroline Bruckner, Executive-in-Residence, Accounting and Taxation and
Managing Director, Kogod Tax Policy Center), https://smallbusiness.house.gov/uploadedfiles/10-417_bruckner_testimony.pdf; Caroline Bruckner, Congress Failed to Fix Tax Woes for Gig Workers, CHI. TRIB.
(Feb. 15, 2018, 3:00 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-perspec-gig-economytaxes-uber-lyft-airbnb-0216-20180215-story.html; Letter from Caroline Bruckner, Managing Dir., Kogod
Tax Policy Ctr., to Co-Chairs of the Bipartisan Individual Income Tax Reform Working Grp. (Apr. 15, 2015)
(on file with American University).
Improving Tax Administration Today: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and IRS Oversight of the
Comm. on Fin., 115th Cong. 29 (2018) (statement of Caroline Bruckner Executive-in-Residence, Accounting
and Taxation and Managing Director, Kogod Tax Policy Center) [hereinafter July 2018 Senate Testimony].
Laura Saunders, Number of Americans Caught Underpaying Their Taxes Surges 40%, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 11,
2017, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-numberof-americans-caught-underpayingsometaxessurges-40-1502443801.
BARRY F. HUSTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42035, SOCIAL SECURITY PRIMER 8 (2020); see also infra text
accompanying notes 131–40.
See HUSTON, supra note 11, at 1.
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Social Security contributions. 13 The failure to consider these implications matters
because “the most fundamental shortcoming of the current [U.S. retirement] system
is that millions of working Americans have no easy way to save for retirement on
the job outside of Social Security.” 14
This Article provides new insight on the Social Security implications of OnDemand Economy work using the U.S. Census Bureau’s (Census) redesigned Survey
of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) 15 to estimate the populations and
earnings of self-employed, non-employer workers working outside of a traditional
employment relationship (Independent Contractors), 16 as well as individuals
working in occupations that occur in the On-Demand Economy (On-Demand
Workers). 17
13

14
15

16

17

However, there has been some important work on On-Demand Workers’ income insecurity, Social Security
and retirement issues. See Janine Berg, Income Security in the On-Demand Economy: Findings and Policy
Lessons from a Survey of Crowdworkers, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 543, 544 (2016); Paul M. Secunda,
Uber Retirement, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 435, 436–37 (2017). More recently, in 2019, the U.S. Treasury
Inspector General for Tax Administration published the results of an audit finding that underreporting of
SE tax of On-Platform gig workers in recent years warrants a focus on SE tax compliance. TREASURY
INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., EXPANSION OF THE GIG ECONOMY WARRANTS FOCUS ON IMPROVING SELFEMPLOYMENT TAX COMPLIANCE 1 (2019); see also Caroline Bruckner & Annette Nellen, Failure to Innovate:
Tax Compliance and the Gig Economy Workforce, 96 ST. TAX NOTES 485, 486 (2019).
DAVID S. MITCHELL, ASPEN INST. FIN. SEC. PROGRAM, BUILDING A MORE ROBUST AND INCLUSIVE U.S.
RETIREMENT SYSTEM AMID A CHANGING ECONOMY 4 (2017).
Data on business ownership and individual earnings can be obtained through a number of Census products.
See, e.g., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2015 SIPP PRODUCTION: SIPP PUBLIC USE METADATA REPORT (2018)
[hereinafter 2015 SIPP PRODUCTION]. One of the main surveys to measure this data is SIPP, which is
conducted in a series of national panels, with sample sizes ranging from approximately 14,000 to 36,700
interviewed households. The duration of each panel lasts one year. SIPP is the third-largest household
survey administered by Census, focused on providing accurate and comprehensive information about the
income and program participation of individuals and households in the United States. The re-engineered
2014 SIPP survey provides a unique analysis that other instruments do not capture. Specifically, it
measures self-employment and participation in concurrent employment measured by industry and
occupation. Additionally, it provides analysis on the amount of income derived from each type of
employment. Because of this unique ability, SIPP provides a foundation to estimate the number of selfemployed individuals, the number of self-employed individuals in particular industries and occupations,
and the amount of income that these individuals derive from these types of employment. As with any
survey, there are some limitations with these estimates. The data is self-reported, meaning that individuals
can incorrectly report their self-employment status, their occupation or industry, and the amount of income
that they derived from these employment relationships.
Using SIPP data, we define “Independent Contractors” as respondents who stated that they were selfemployed with no employees, owned their own business instead of being employed by another employer, or
were in an “other work arrangement” for their type of work arrangement. Id. at 1451–57. This definition
excludes individuals employed by an employer or in an “other work arrangement, with no employees, in
specified occupations.” Id.
Using SIPP data, we define “On-Demand Workers” as individuals employed by an employer or in an “other
work arrangement, with no employees, in specified occupations including babysitting and child care
services; dog walking; house sitting; disabled adult or eldercare services; house cleaning; house painting;
yard work; property maintenance work; other personal services work such as running errands or helping
people move; jewelers; or driving. Dummy variable created by merging EJB1_JBORSE through
EJB7_JBORSE, variables TJB1_EMPB through TJB7_EMPB, and selected occupations in TJB1_OCC
through TJB7_OCC in the 2014 Panel Wave 2 Metadata. Id. at 1451–57, 1689–95, 1570–1642. One of the
limitations of using SIPP data is that this definition is too broad in that it could include employees of
employers. In addition, the Census SIPP experts we consulted in indicated this definition could include
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SIPP data can supplement other existing government data sets for federal
tax policy purposes because of the large number of individuals surveyed, reporting
of earnings, and collection of demographic information. In addition, SIPP has the
ability to capture individuals not otherwise represented in other government
surveys and instruments of On-Demand Economy workers because SIPP is able to
measure multiple on-demand and independent contract arrangements. SIPP data
has the potential to capture non-employee workers earning income using OnDemand Platforms to connect with customers and process payment (“On-Platform
Workers”) as well as non-employee workers earning income in occupations occurring
in the On-Demand Economy not using On-Demand Platforms (“Off-Platform
Workers”). Most importantly for purposes of this project, SIPP provides data to
enable us to estimate the amount of income derived from these work
arrangements. 18
However, SIPP does have its limitations, and the estimates in this Article are
supplemental, illustrative estimates designed to add to the existing literature on
the Social Security implications of the tax compliance of these self-employed
workers. 19 For example, the SIPP data on self-employment do not specifically
identify individuals who earn income working with On-Demand Platforms. To
address this limitation, we have identified individuals with occupations occurring in
the On-Demand Economy as reflected by their SIPP responses. As such, our
estimates of On-Demand Workers include both On-Platform Workers and OffPlatform Workers, a population that is likely larger than the On-Demand Platform
workforce. 20 In addition, our estimates on the earnings of both populations are not
necessarily the net of expenses and are understatements of the collective earnings

18

19

20

individuals who identified as employees, despite the fact they were actually independent contractors. In
addition, this definition is too narrow in that it does not include occupations occurring in the On-Demand
Economy such as renting rooms, cars, or other assets.
A more in-depth discussion of the advantages of SIPP to supplement other government surveys is discussed
in the Methodology section. See infra pp. 90–93.
As with any survey, there are some limitations that will impact the estimates we calculated using SIPP
data. The data is self-reported, meaning that individuals can incorrectly report their self-employment
status, their occupation or industry, and the amount of income that they derived from these employment
relationships. SIPP has its advantages over other estimates because it can capture respondents’ data on
multiple employment points and is not limited to questions on an individual’s main job or primary source of
income. See infra pp. 90–93.
We recognize that the criteria we used to identify Independent Contractors and On-Demand Workers to
extrapolate earnings and demographic data from the SIPP are imprecise measures of the total population of
these self-employed workers. For example, the Census SIPP experts we consulted in connection with this
work indicated that while our estimates on the population of On-Demand Workers were potentially overinclusive, the measures we used to extrapolate the collective earnings of Independent Contractors and OnDemand Workers were too conservative. In order to provide additional context for our estimates using SIPP
data, we included additional estimates using the most recent data on alternative contingent workers and
gig-economy workers available from the U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the
JPMCI 2018 Study, and the 2019 TIGTA Audit. See infra Table 3.
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of the populations of Independent Contractors and On-Demand Workers we
identified using SIPP. 21
Notwithstanding these data limitations, this Article expands the existing
research on the SE tax compliance of Independent Contractors and On-Demand
Workers by focusing on the Social Security implications of the failure of these
taxpayers to accurately report income and pay SE taxes on this income. It also
considers corresponding demographic data with respect to these populations of
workers and makes critical policy recommendations regarding Independent
Contractor tax compliance generally and, more specifically, On-Demand Workers to
address the SE tax underreporting we estimate.
Part I summarizes the relevant SE tax, filing, and information reporting
rules as well as the corresponding tax compliance issues of both Independent
Contractors and On-Demand Workers. Part II introduces the existing challenges of
measuring independent and On-Demand Economy workers and provides estimates
on Independent Contractors and On-Demand Workers to supplement the existing
literature using SIPP data. Part III, relying on SIPP data, estimates how much
income Independent Contractors and On-Demand Workers earned in 2014.
Part IV approximates the amount of SE taxes that should have been paid on
this income and estimates the Social Security underpayment amount using
information from the U.S. Treasury’s Inspector General for Tax Administration’s
analysis of underreporting of SE taxes and information gained from research on OnDemand Platforms and the IRS about issuance of tax reporting forms. Part V
examines the demographic makeup of Independent Contractors and On-Demand
Workers, estimates the impact of failing to report self-employed income on Social
Security in 2014, and discusses the potential long-term implications. Finally, Part
VI makes critical policy recommendations targeted to increase the tax compliance of
Independent Contractors and On-Demand Workers by modernizing information
reporting, updating timing requirements for estimated payments, and developing
distribution information on the tax requirements for Independent Contractors and
On-Demand Economy workers on the payment of SE taxes.
I. BACKGROUND ON TAX AND REPORTING RULES FOR INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTORS AND ON-DEMAND WORKERS
The U.S. tax system is a pay-as-you-go system of tax collection. Since World
War II, employees have had a portion of their wages withheld by their employers
and remitted to the IRS in anticipation of an employee’s annual income and payroll

21

According to the Census SIPP experts we consulted, the earnings variables we used understated the total
amount of earnings of Independent Contractors and On-Demand Workers because we only included
earnings for people who reported gross total amounts that they actually received during the year. Some
SIPP respondents included in our Independent Contractor and On-Demand Worker populations may have
reported their earnings another way (such as their average monthly or bi-weekly income, for example), and
the measure we used would not include their earnings at all. See supra note 20 discussion.
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tax liability, such as Social Security and Medicare. 22 Employee tax withholding was
originally enacted as a means to raise revenue to fund increased government
operations during wartime and was designed to “smooth [employees’] after-tax
income throughout the year and facilitate[] revenue collection by the IRS.” 23
However, Independent Contractors and On-Demand Workers are not
generally treated as employees for U.S. tax purposes. Instead, they are treated as
self-employed with respect to their earnings. 24 Under current tax rules, selfemployed workers are typically not subject to employer income and payroll tax
withholding. Instead, Independent Contractors and On-Demand Workers are
required to make estimated income tax payments to federal and state tax collection
agencies for federal and state income taxes and, when annual net earnings are at
least $400, 15.3% in self-employment tax. 25
The absence of withholding leads to the underreporting of taxes by a
significant number of self-employed taxpayers, who have “different pain points than
their employee counterparts with respect to their tax filings.” 26 Government and
academic research on the tax compliance of the self-employed reflect these
challenges, and “there is a large literature showing that this group consistently and
substantially underreports their income to . . . tax authorities.” 27 A 2018 tax
preparer industry survey found that 32% of self-employed workers admitted to

22

23
24

25

26
27

Seth D. Harris & Alan B. Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for Twenty-First-Century Work:
The “Independent Worker,” HAMILTON PROJECT 18 (2015),
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/modernizing_labor_laws_for_twenty_first_century_work_kruege
r_harris.pdf.
Id.
For background information on worker classification and its relevance to On-Demand Workers and U.S. tax
rules, see Annette Nellen, Caroline Bruckner & Jennifer Brown, Taxes and the Growing Gig Workforce:
What to Know, 128 J. TAX’N 6, 8, 15 (2018). A primary reason for why policymakers, tax and labor experts,
and On-Demand Platforms have been slow to tackle the simmering tax and compliance issues underlying
the On-Demand Economy is the looming question of whether workers who provide services to customers via
On-Demand Platforms are misclassified employees. Misclassification issues have long stymied
Congressional efforts to address tax and benefits issues of self-employed workers. Rarely have policymakers
been able to reach consensus on strategies to address worker misclassification for either tax or labor law
purposes. With the advent of the tech-enabled On-Demand Economy and the at least 2.3 million taxpayers
now earning income selling goods and services through On-Demand Platforms every month, Congressional
action to address tax compliance challenges of these taxpayers should be the top priority, separate and
apart from resolving any corresponding worker misclassification issues. See Caroline Bruckner, Response to
Questions for the Record in Connection with U.S. Senate Committee on Finance Subcommittee on Taxation
and IRS Oversight July Hearing (Sept. 19, 2018) (responding to question from Sen. Thune as to whether
resolving misclassification of on-demand workers should be a legislative priority) (unpublished) (on file with
author).
Financing of the Social Security program is authorized by the revenue collected pursuant to: (1) the Federal
Insurance Contributions Act (FICA), which applies to employers and employees, and (2) the SelfEmployment Contributions Act, which applies to self-employment income. HUSTON, supra note 11, at 3.
BRUCKNER, supra note 1, at 9, 15.
Erik Hurst, Geng Li & Benjamin Pugsley, Are Household Surveys like Tax Forms: Evidence from Income
Underreporting of the Self Employed 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16527, 2010)
(finding that the self-employed underreport their income on household surveys by 30%).
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underreporting their income for tax purposes and that 36% “d[id]n’t do taxes at
all.” 28
The amount and timing requirements of quarterly estimated payments and
the information reporting regime for On-Demand Platform work, create tax
compliance challenges for SE taxes that often trigger non-filing, underpayment,
and nonpayment of taxes—in many cases, unwittingly by taxpayers who are
unfamiliar with paying taxes on self-employment income. 29 In fact, anecdotal
evidence from tax preparers advising Independent Contractors and On-Demand
Workers suggests that while these taxpayers are generally aware that they may
owe income taxes on their earnings, many are surprised to learn they owe SE taxes,
too. 30
A. Self-Employment Tax
Unlike traditional employees who are subject to payroll taxes and
withholding by employers that also pay a portion of employees’ payroll taxes,
taxpayers with self-employment income pay the combined employee and employer
share of Social Security and Medicare taxes pursuant to the Self-Employment
Contributions Act (SECA). 31 Any taxpayer with net earnings of four hundred dollars
or more of self-employment income is required to pay SE tax and file a Schedule
SE. 32 While self-employed taxpayers pay the combined employer and employee
share of Social Security and Medicare taxes, they are allowed a deduction of onehalf of their total SE tax paid for federal income tax purposes. 33
When SE tax is combined with federal income tax, it can add up quickly for
Independent Contractors and On-Demand Workers and can create significant tax
compliance issues. 34 For example, in a 2015 survey on the tax compliance
28

29
30
31

32

33
34

32% of Self-Employed Workers Admit They Under Report Taxable Income, CPA PRAC. ADVISOR (Apr. 24,
2018), https://www.cpapracticeadvisor.com/news/12409241/32-of-self-employed-workers-admit-they-underreport-taxable-income. Of the 36% of respondents who did not pay taxes at all, 9% admitted to not having a
reason, 17% claimed to not make enough to owe taxes, and the remaining 10% answered they had losses
that exceeded their profits. Id.
BRUCKNER, supra note 1, at 9–11.
Id.
HUSTON, supra note 11, at 3. Specifically, employees and employers each pay 6.2% Social Security tax on up
to $137,700 of earnings in 2020 and an additional 1.45% Medicare tax on all earnings (i.e., the two
components add up to 7.65% in tax paid by employees and then 7.65% paid by employers). Id. For selfemployed taxpayers it would be 12.4% in Social Security tax on up to $137,700 on net earnings and 2.9% in
Medicare tax on their entire net earnings, which is 15.3% cumulatively.
Self-Employment Tax (Social Security and Medicare Taxes), INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/self-employment-tax-social-security-andmedicare-taxes (last updated Nov. 25, 2020).
Id.
See BRUCKNER, supra note 1, at 11–12. However, with respect to On-Demand Workers who earn income
from home-sharing or real property rental activities, the tax reporting rules are more complicated. For
example, many individuals with rental income report that income and those expenses on a Schedule E and
are not subject to SE tax on that income; however, certain real estate professionals who earn rental income
may be required to file a Schedule C and are subject to SE tax. See, e.g., ERNST & YOUNG LLP, GENERAL
GUIDANCE ON THE TAXATION OF INCOME 16 (2017), https://assets.airbnb.com/eyguidance/us.pdf.
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challenges of On-Platform Workers, almost forty-three percent of surveyed
respondents did not set aside any money and were not aware of how much they
would owe on income earned from working with an On-Demand Platform as a
service provider or seller. 35
B. Quarterly-Estimated Payments
In addition to the confusion surrounding the amount of income and SE tax
owed by taxpayers with self-employment income, the timing of when to pay
presents additional certainty. 36 Under current tax rules, when self-employed
taxpayers are expected to owe at least $1,000 in taxes and are not subject to
withholding, advance payments of estimated tax are due to the IRS in quarterly
installments. 37 These payments are due on April 15, June 15, September 15, and
January 15 and are referred to as quarterly-estimated payments. 38
“In calculating whether a taxpayer needs to make quarterly-estimated
payments throughout the year, taxpayers need to include both income taxes and
self-employment taxes owed—minus any refundable credits—”on any income not
subject to withholding. 39 Added together, income tax and SE tax liabilities for
Independent Contractors and On-Demand Workers can quickly reach the $1,000
threshold for triggering quarterly-estimated payments. For example, a ridesharing
driver who earns $7,500 driving part-time for an On-Demand Platform and earns no
other income would have an SE tax liability of $1,060 triggering a required filing of
estimate payments even if no income tax is owed. 40
Moreover, survey data suggest that many taxpayers are unaware of the
requirements of quarterly-estimated payments. For example, a 2015 survey of
experienced SE taxpayers found that one-third of survey respondents earning
income in the On-Demand Economy reported not knowing whether or not they were
required to file quarterly estimated payments with the IRS. 41

35
36
37
38

39
40
41

BRUCKNER, supra note 1, at 10.
Id.
I.R.C. § 6654 (2018).
Id. For 2020, the U.S. Department of Treasury and IRS extended some tax due dates in response to the
COVID-19 pandemic. See, e.g., Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., IRS Extends More Tax Deadlines to
Cover Individuals, Trusts, Estates Corporations and Others (Apr. 9, 2020),
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-extends-more-tax-deadlines-to-cover-individuals-trusts-estatescorporations-and-others.
BRUCKNER, supra note 1, at 10; see I.R.S. Form 1040-ES, (2020), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1040es.pdf.
Nellen et al., supra note 24, at 15.
BRUCKNER, supra note 1, at 11.
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C. Information Reporting Requirements
Lack of information and understanding of what is required for tax compliance
purposes is a common complaint among SE taxpayers. 42 In terms of calculating
taxes and reconciling income, employees who have income and payroll taxes
withheld and remitted to the IRS by their employers receive an IRS Form W-2 from
their employers to use to fill out their tax returns in April. 43 In contrast, SE
taxpayers who pay income and SE taxes via quarterly-estimated payments are
subject to a separate set of information reporting rules and forms for non-employee
compensation (for example, IRS Forms 1099) that are reported to the IRS by payors
and third-party settlement organizations (“TPSO”). 44 However, On-Demand
Workers who are On-Platform Workers are not as likely to have their income
reported to the IRS. 45 Under the current tax reporting rules for income of OnPlatform Workers, it is unlikely that these workers will receive any Form 1099 to
file their taxes. 46
Generally, SE workers are supposed to receive a Form 1099-MISC for
payments by businesses for more than $600 for goods or services that they
provide. 47 However, if an SE worker receives payments from customers via an OnDemand Platform, then the IRS generally considers the On-Demand Platform to be
a TPSO for tax reporting purposes. 48 This matters because TPSOs are not required
to file a Form 1099-K with the IRS or send a copy to a service provider or seller
unless the aggregate number of transactions of a service provider or seller exceeds
two hundred and the amount reported exceeds twenty thousand dollars (“200/$20K
Form 1099-K Threshold”). 49
Most On-Demand Platforms use the 200/$20K Form 1099-K Threshold for
providing Form 1099-Ks to service providers and sellers, which is consistent with
IRS filing requirements, rather than the $600 Form 1099-MISC threshold. 50 While
adopting the higher threshold is consistent with current IRS reporting
requirements, it results in fewer Form 1099-Ks being sent to workers and the IRS
because most On-Platform Workers do not earn more than $20,000 to trigger the

42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

See id. at 12 (noting that more than one-third of survey respondents did not understand record-keeping
requirements for tax purposes).
Internal Revenue Serv., About Form W-2, Wage and Tax Statement, https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/aboutform-w-2 (last updated Oct. 29, 2020).
BRUCKNER, supra note 1, at 9.
See id.
See id. at 10.
I.R.C. § 6041(a) (2018).
See I.R.S. P.L.R. 201604003 (Jan. 22, 2016); I.R.S. P.L.R. 201619006 (May 6, 2016); I.R.S. P.L.R. 201719009
(May 12, 2017); I.R.S. P.L.R. 201836008 (Sept. 7, 2018).
I.R.C. § 6050W (2018).
See July 2018 Senate Testimony, supra note 9 (noting that most platforms do not send 1099-Ks for earnings
unless the 200/$20K Form1099-K Threshold is met).
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threshold. 51 A survey found that as few as thirty-two percent of On-Platform
Workers received a Form 1099-MISC or Form 1099-K in 2015. 52
In 2019, an analysis prepared by the State of California’s Franchise Tax
Board (“California Tax Analysis”) revealed that of the top 100 On-Demand
Platforms in 2016, only twelve percent issued Form 1099-Ks to service providers
and, of those twelve percent, only half issued more than fifty-five. 53 The California
Tax Analysis also indicated widespread tax compliance issues of gig workers, noting
that gig workers may not know how much they earned, what income must be
reported, how to report gig income, or any offsets they could claim to lower tax
liabilities. 54 More broadly, the California Tax Analysis reflects the underlying
reality of the impact of the current information reporting rules for On-Demand
Platform workers: the majority of sellers and service providers earning income
doing On-Platform work do not receive any Form 1099-K, which means the IRS does
not either. 55
Consequently, efforts to quantify the population of Independent Contractors
and, specifically, the On-Demand Platform workforce using information reporting
filings (such as Forms 1099) can be particularly challenging. 56 In fact, some experts
have concluded that although the Form 1099-K has been used since 2011 to report
settlement of payment card transactions or settlement of third-party network
transactions, it is “relatively unusual” for self-employed individuals to receive a
Form 1099-K and “most are not issued to unincorporated self-employed
individuals.” 57 Nonetheless, while self-employment earnings may (or may not be)
subject to information reporting, taxpayers who earn income for services provided
are expected to report those payments on Schedule C of their Form 1040, “even if
the individual received no information returns in connection with their taxable

51
52
53

54
55
56

57

Id.; see also BRUCKNER, supra note 1, at 9.
BRUCKNER, supra note 1, at 10.
CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BD., GIG ECONOMY AND TAX COMPLIANCE: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 14 (2019),
https://www.ftb.ca.gov/about-ftb/meetings/board-meetings/2019/october-01/gig-economy-and-taxcompliance.pdf.
Id. at 16.
July 2018 Senate Testimony, supra note 9.
See Emilie Jackson, Adam Looney & Shanthi Ramnath, The Rise of Alternative Work Arrangements:
Evidence and Implications for Tax Filing and Benefit Coverage (2018),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/about/about-the
bureau/adrm/FESAC/meetings/Ramnath%20Presentation.pdf (reviewing the findings from their 2017 paper
of the same name and noting that a “large fraction of people with SE income did not receive a 1099-MISC,”
and “very few people receive a 1099-K”); see also Letter from the U.S. Dep’t. of the Treasury to Sen. Mark
Warner (Oct. 27, 2015), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-federal/worker-classification/treasurysuggests-how-senator-can-gauge-size-demand-economy/2015/11/18/g024?highlight%E2%80%A6 (explaining
why publicly available taxpayer filings “do[] not provide a good measure of contingent workforce or
independent contractor income, let alone the on-demand economy”).
Katherine G. Abraham, John C. Haltiwanger, Kristin Sandusky & James R. Spletzer, Measuring the Gig
Economy: Current Knowledge and Open Issues (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24950,
2018), http://www.nber.org/papers/w24950.pdf.
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earnings and even if their business expenses fully offset the gross payments
received.” 58
However, even when On-Platform Workers receive a Form 1099-K, tax
compliance is not guaranteed. For example, the 2019 Treasury Inspector General
for Tax Administration (TIGTA) Audit considered the tax compliance rates of 3.8
million workers who actually received Form 1099-Ks from one of nine specific OnDemand Platforms that processed payment for gig workers from 2012 to 2016. 59
Ultimately, the 2019 TIGTA Audit found that 812,018 individuals (25%) filed a
Form 1040 but did not report their Form 1099-K income on either Schedule C or
line 21 (other income) of their Form 1040. 60 Also, 13% of individuals with an SE tax
liability who received a Form 1099-K failed to file a Schedule SE with their Form
1040. 61
II. SIZING UP THE PROBLEM: ESTIMATES ON THE SIZE OF THE INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR AND ON-DEMAND WORKFORCE
While there is consensus that self-employed taxpayers have tax compliance
and underreporting issues, the size of the population of independent workers and
the On-Demand Economy workforce has been the subject of much debate in recent
years. The fundamental problem is that “different data sources provide different
answers to the simple question of what is the level and trend of self-employment in
the U.S. economy.” 62 In addition, “although traditional (offline) informal paid work
has always been part of the labor sector, the rise of online enabled paid work
activities requires new approaches to measure this growing trend.” 63 Put simply,
measuring workers with self-employment income subject to SE tax—including both
On-Platform and Off-Platform workers—can be challenging.
A. Government Efforts to Measure Independent Contractors and On-Demand
Workers
Even if government initiatives have endeavored to measure the population
and earnings of Independent Contractors or On-Demand Platform Workers, there
are practical impediments that can skew results, such as definitional challenges or
58
59

60
61
62
63

Id.
TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., EXPANSIONS OF THE GIG ECONOMY WARRANTS FOCUS ON
IMPROVING SELF-EMPLOYMENT TAX COMPLIANCE 7 fig. 1 (2019),
https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2019reports/201930016fr.pdf [hereinafter 2019 TIGTA AUDIT].
Id.
Id.
Abraham et al., supra note 57, at 15.
Barbara Robles & Marysol McGee, Exploring Online and Offline Informal Work: Findings from the
Enterprising and Informal Work Activities (EIWA) Survey 1 (Fin. and Econ. Discussion Series Divs. of
Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs, Working Paper No. 2016-089 2016),
https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2016.089. The EIWA Survey defined on-demand works as “task-for-fee work,
renting and selling used items, and other informal work activities among households both online and
offline.” Id. at 3.
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the kind of data used. 64 For example, a comprehensive U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) analysis of the state of measuring contingent work
illustrated the difficulty in measuring these populations because estimates “can
range from less than 5 percent to more than a third of the total employed labor
force, depending on the definition of contingent work and the data source.” 65
A 2017 analysis of administrative tax records from the U.S. Treasury’s Office
of Tax Analysis (OTA) found that, in 2014, only a small group—109,700
individuals—filed a tax return reporting income earned from an On-Demand
Platform. 66 OTA also acknowledged, however, that the total count of gig workers
was:
[L]ikely to be an undercount of the true number of individuals that
participated in the “gig economy” because some participants may not
have filed a return or not filed a Schedule C reporting that income;
because some platforms firms do not provide 1099s to all of their
participants; and also because not all prominent service providers
could not be found in the data . . . . 67
In 2019, the IRS Statistics of Income Joint Statistical Research Program
released new findings based on information returns, which found that from 2000 to
2016, workers who received Forms 1099 (including both IRS Form 1099-K and IRS
Form 1099-MISC) grew by 1.9% and accounted for 11.8% of the current workforce. 68
In addition, almost all of the “dramatic growth” of this workforce since 2007 was
attributable to workers using online platforms to connect with customers and
service providers. 69 It should be noted that online labor gig work is a trend that was
“virtually non-existent” prior to 2012, but, in 2016, 1.9 million workers had some
online platform earnings. 70 Markedly, the study found that only one-third of OnPlatform Workers paid SE tax, so the data excluded “the majority of participants in
this part of the ‘gig’ economy.” 71
Tax data is not the only source for measuring the gig economy workforce. In
2018, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (“BLS”) released the results of its 2017
survey of alternative contingent workers (“ACW”), which found that 6.9% of the
64

65
66
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See, e.g., Emilie Jackson, Adam Looney & Shanthi Ramnath, The Rise of Alternative Work Arrangements:
Evidence and Implications for Tax Filing and Benefit Coverage 6 (Office of Tax Analysis, Working Paper No.
114, 2017).
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-168R, CONTINGENT WORKFORCE: SIZE, CHARACTERISTICS,
EARNINGS, AND BENEFITS 3 (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/669899.pdf [hereinafter GAO].
Jackson et al., supra note 64, at 18.
Id. at 15. The IRS developed the Form 1099-K for submission by payers starting in 2012 for reportable
payments made in 2011. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE IS
UNDERUTILIZING FORM 1099-K DATA TO IDENTIFY TAX RETURNS FOR AUDIT 1 (2017).
Brett Collins, Andrew Garin, Emilie Jackson, Dmitri Koustas & Mark Payne, Is Gig Work Replacing
Traditional Employment? Evidence from Two Decades of Tax Returns 3 (Internal Revenue Serv. 2019),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/19rpgigworkreplacingtraditionalemployment.pdf.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 21.
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workforce (approximately 10.6 million individuals) were independent contractors, a
number that remained virtually unchanged since 2005 when the survey was last
administered. 72
Importantly, this measure applied only where an alternative or contingent
work arrangement was a person’s “sole or main job” and, therefore, excluded the
majority of On-Platform workers who provide services and goods as a secondary,
rather than primary, source of income. 73 In an effort to capture this population, in
September 2018, BLS released the Contingent Worker Supplement (“CWS”) to the
Current Population Survey (“CPS”), which included four questions designed to
specifically gauge “gig economy” participation through electronically mediated work.
The BLS found that, in May 2017, approximately 1.6 million workers did work for
an On-Demand Platform. 74 Notably, the 2017 BLS Gig Economy Supplement
measured far fewer On-Demand Platform workers than other, more expansive
studies had counted. 75 Also, BLS indicated that the questions used to measure gig
workers did not work as intended and that, going forward, “BLS should not again
attempt to collect data about electronically mediated work using the four new
questions fielded in the May 2017 CWS.” 76
B. Non-Government Measures of On-Demand Platform Workforce
There are also various nongovernment and private sector surveys, estimates,
and projections on the size and scope of independent workers. Results from these
surveys, estimates, or projections are dependent on how “independent contractor” is
defined. For example, in 2016, the McKinsey Global Institute found that
approximately twenty seven percent of the workforce (sixty-eight million
individuals) was engaged in independent contract work. 77 That same study also
found that at least “15 percent of the independent workers [it] surveyed have used a
digital platform to find work, but the so-called on-demand economy is growing
rapidly.” 78 Other private sector surveys have found comparably large contingencies
72

73
74

75
76
77

78

BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, USDL-18-0942, CONTINGENT AND ALTERNATIVE EMPLOYMENT
ARRANGEMENTS—MAY 2017 6 (June 7, 2018), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/conemp.pdf [hereinafter
BLS ACW 2017 SURVEY] (finding independent contractor workforce decreased by 0.5% from 2005 to 2017).
The 2017 BLS ACW Survey also identified 2.6 million on-call workers, 1.4 million temporary help agency
workers, and 933,000 contract workers. Id. at 1.
Id.; JPMCI 2018 STUDY, supra note 2, at 5.
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Electronically Mediated Work: New Questions in the Contingent Worker
Supplement, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Sept. 2018, at 1–2,
https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2018/article/pdf/electronically-mediated-work-new-questions-in-thecontingent-worker-supplement.pdf [hereinafter 2017 BLS Gig Economy Supplement].
Compare id. at 13, 19, with, e.g., JPMCI 2018 STUDY, supra note 2, at 2.
2017 BLS Gig Economy Supplement, supra note 74, at 14, 24.
MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., MCKINSEY & CO., INDEPENDENT WORK: CHOICE, NECESSITY, AND THE GIG ECONOMY 32
(2016),
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Featured%20Insights/Employment%20and%20Growth/Indep
endent%20work%20Choice%20necessity%20and%20the%20gig%20economy/Independent-Work-Choicenecessity-and-the-gig-economy-Full-report.pdf.
Id.
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of independent contractors. For example, Upwork and the Freelancer’s Union
conducted a survey in 2019 that found that 35% of the workforce (approximately
fifty-seven million individuals) was employed as independent contractors. 79 In 2019,
MBO Partners, in their annual survey of the independent workforce, found that
41.1 million individuals were independent contractors. 80
In terms of measuring the On-Demand Economy specifically, a 2015 survey
developed by the Aspen Institute, Time, and Burston-Marsteller, and conducted by
Penn Schoen Berland, found that approximately twenty-two percent of American
adults (forty-five million individuals) have participated in the On-Demand Economy
as a worker. 81 In 2016, the former Chief Economist at the U.S. Department of
Labor, Lawrence Katz, and former Chair of the White House Counsel of Economic
Advisors under President Obama, Alan Krueger, published a paper estimating that
0.5% of all workers participated in the On-Demand Economy. 82
Importantly, in September 2018, J.P. Morgan Chase Institute (“JPMCI”)
updated its landmark 2016 study on the On-Demand Economy, concluding that 2.3
million families with Chase checking accounts engage in On-Platform work every
month and that 5.5 million households have income from On-Platform work every
year. 83 The JPMCI 2018 Study is particularly important and serves as a benchmark
for measuring On-Platform work participation; both because it relies on actual
income flowing into On-Platform Workers bank accounts (as opposed to survey
responses or tax filings) and because it includes data from 2012 through 2018—a
period of extraordinary growth for this sector. 84
C. SIPP Data Measuring Independent Contractors and On-Demand Workers
Although not as robust as the JPMCI 2018 Study, SIPP data can provide
significant insight into the population of self-employed workers. For example, using
SIPP data, we found that 7.1 million respondents identified as self-employed small
businesses with no employees, which we defined as Independent Contractors. 85 We
further identified 3.12 million On-Demand Workers participating in occupations
occurring in the On-Demand Economy, which would include both On-Platform and
Off-Platform work. 86
79
80
81

82

83
84
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FIA 2019 Report, supra note 5.
MBO 2019 REPORT, supra note 4, at 7.
Catherine Sullivan, Forty-Five Million Americans Say They Have Worked in the On-Demand Economy,
While 86.5 Million Have Used It, According to New Survey, ASPEN INST. (Jan. 6, 2016),
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/news/2016/01/06/forty-five-million-americans-say-they-have-worked-demandeconomy-while-865-million.
Lawrence F. Katz & Alan B. Krueger, The Rise and Nature of Alternative Work Arrangements in the United
States, 1995-2015, 72 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 382, 383 (2019). Notably, this paper did not include
accommodation sharing (e.g., Airbnb hosts), which are included in other major studies. Compare id., with
JPMCI 2018 STUDY, supra note 2, and BLS ACW 2017 SURVEY, supra note 72.
JPMCI 2018 STUDY, supra note 2, at 6.
See id.
See supra notes 16–19 discussion and accompanying text.
Id.
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However, our results are not entirely consistent with the findings of the
JPMCI 2018 Study, which looked at thirty-nine million bank accounts with deposits
from 128 On-Demand Platforms. 87 For example, SIPP did not specifically track
electronically mediated or On-Platform work, so our estimates rely on
approximations of occupations occurring in the On-Demand Economy. In addition,
the SIPP data we used to measure On-Demand Workers did not include occupations
in the leasing of assets and generating rental income, which were included in the
JPMCI 2018 Study. 88
Our review of SIPP data finds that Independent Contractors and On-Demand
Workers combined represented approximately 10.22 million workers. To provide
context for this finding, consider that the 2017 BLS ACW Survey identified 10.6
million workers as independent contractors, and another 1.6 million working as OnPlatform Workers. 89
III. EARNINGS OF INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS AND ON-DEMAND WORKERS
Similar to the discrepancies and disparities in the government and private
measurement of the size of the independent contract and on-demand workforce,
there is little consensus on the average or median amounts of income earned by
these groups of workers. However, the work that has been done consistently
suggests that, in general, independent contractors earn more income than OnPlatform workers.
A. Private Sector Estimates of Earnings of On-Demand Workforce
In 2019, MBO Partners found that the average income for full-time
independent contractors was $68,300 and that almost 20% of full-time independent
contractors made more than $100,000. 90 Additionally, the Upwork and the
Freelancers Union found that in 2019, freelancers (i.e., independent workers)
contributed almost 5% to the U.S. gross domestic product, or $1 trillion. 91
In terms of earnings of On-Platform Workers, the JPMCI 2018 Study found
that “platform earnings represent a major source of income for families during the
months they participate in the On-Demand Economy, but just 20 percent of income
among those who have participated at any point over the prior year.” 92 This
research suggests that On-Platform Workers, unlike Independent Contractors, do
not typically do On-Platform work for their sole-source of income and that most
participants “are active in just a few months out of the year.” 93
87
88
89
90
91
92
93

JPMCI 2018 STUDY, supra note 2, at 2.
Id.
BLS ACW 2017 SURVEY, supra note 72, at 1.
MBO 2019 REPORT, supra note 4, at 8.
FIA 2019 Report, supra note 5.
JPMCI 2018 STUDY, supra note 2, at 7.
Id. at 6.
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Average monthly earnings for On-Platform Workers ranged from $608
(selling goods) to $1,736 (leasing assets), with the majority of these workers earning
monthly income averaging $783 (providing transportation services). 94 This cycling
in and out of the On-Platform work or “churn” means that income from this work
varies wildly every month. As a result, annualizing the monthly earnings on OnPlatform Workers is not an accurate measure of these workers’ annual earnings.
B. SIPP Estimates of Independent Contractor and On-Demand Worker
Earnings
SIPP provides additional insight into the collective earnings of Independent
Contractors and On-Demand Workers, which, in turn, can provide further insight
as to the Social Security implications for these populations. Using data from SIPP,
we found that individuals who were Independent Contractors reported that they
collectively earned approximately $204.1 billion in income in 2014 from these
employment relationships. On-Demand Workers collectively earned approximately
$35.97 billion in income from these employment relationships in 2014. 95 Although
our population estimates of On-Demand Workers may be over inclusive, our
estimates of their earnings are certainly conservative and likely an underestimate
of the collective earnings of On-Demand Workers. That noted, these estimates,
while not an approximation for taxable income, can be used to gauge the
underpayment of SE tax and Social Security contributions of these populations.
IV.ESTIMATES OF UNDERREPORTED SELF-EMPLOYMENT TAX SHOULD HAVE BEEN
COLLECTED FROM INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS & ON-DEMAND WORKERS
Our ability to extrapolate from SIPP the number and earnings of
Independent Contractors and On-Demand Workers is foundational to our estimate
of the corresponding SE tax underpayment by these taxpayers and our ability to
translate those amounts to Social Security contributions. By utilizing
underreporting estimates derived from government research and tax gap analysis,
prior work on tax compliance specific to SE taxes, and likely misreporting of income
due to current information reporting rules, we are able to approximate an estimate
of the amount of underreported SE tax on the earnings of the Independent
Contractors and On-Demand Worker populations we identified using SIPP data.
In addition, we can translate our estimate to the amount of Social Security
contributions that should have been paid on these workers’ earnings. For purposes
of this analysis, we assume all unreported earnings would be subject to SE taxes
and that all workers earned less than $137,700. The background on the tax gap and
existing work on SE tax compliance below provides additional context for
94
95

Id. at 14.
See 2015 SIPP PRODUCTION, supra note 15 (calculating the sum of income reported by independent
contractors and on-demand workers by tabulating applicable TJB1_GAMT1 through TJB7_GAMT
variables); see also supra notes 20–21 discussion and accompanying text.
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understanding our methodology in making these estimates. Our estimates are not
intended to be comparable to estimates developed by Congressional estimators or
other government projections.
A. The Tax Gap and Underreported Self-Employment Taxes
The IRS performs a regular study that estimates the gross tax gap—the
difference between the amount of tax that taxpayers should pay for a given year
and the amount that is paid. 96 The tax gap is measured in terms of non-filing,
underreporting of income, and underpayment of taxes: “Of these three categories,
taxpayer underreporting makes up the vast majority of the tax collection
shortfall.” 97 In 2016, the IRS published data for the tax years 2008 to 2010 and
found a total underreporting tax gap of sixty-five billion dollars of SE tax, an
underpayment tax gap of six billion dollars of employment tax, and an annual nonfiling tax gap of four billion dollars from SE taxes. 98 Additionally, the IRS estimates
that non-reporting of self-employment tax constitutes approximately one percent of
the non-filing gap, and underreporting of self-employment tax constitutes fourteen
percent of the total share of the gross total tax gap. 99
Importantly, the IRS has found that misreporting of income that is subject to
withholding and information reporting is one percent, but where there is no
withholding and there is little or no information reporting, instances of
misreporting jump to sixty-three percent. 100 As Congressional revenue estimators
have noted, noncompliance is greatest for self-employment income “for which thirdparty information is not separately reported to the IRS and is very difficult to
obtain.” 101 Essentially, there is more compliance when income is “visible” to the IRS
and taxpayers through withholding and information reporting. 102

96

97
98

99
100
101
102

Janet Holtzblatt & Jamie McGuire, Factors Affecting Revenue Estimates of Tax Compliance Proposals, Joint
Working Paper of the Congressional Budget Office and the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation 1 (Cong.
Budget Office, Working Paper No. JCX-90-16, 2016),
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4964.
Manoj Viswanathan, Tax Compliance in a Decentralizing Economy, 34 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 283, 287 (2017).
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2008-2010 4 tbl.2 (2016),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/tax%20gap%20estimates%20for%202008%20through%202010.pdf
[hereinafter IRS 2008-2010 Tax Gap Data]. In September 2019, the IRS issued new tax gap data that found
that tax compliance rates had remained “essentially unchanged” from prior years. Press Release, Internal
Revenue Serv., IRS Releases New Tax Game Estimates; Compliance Rates Remain Substantially
Unchanged from Prior Study (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-releases-new-tax-gapestimates-compliance-rates-remain-substantially-unchanged-from-prior-study.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 98, at 4.
Id. at 2.
Holtzblatt & McGuire, supra note 96, at 2.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 98, at 2.
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B. Treasury’s Prior Work on Underpayment of Self-Employed Income Tax
In prior years, the U.S. Treasury considered strategies for addressing the tax
gap through increased auditing and new processes to “accurately identify the
taxpayers and income that are subject to self-employment taxes.” 103 In fact, a 2007
memorandum to the Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement from the
U.S. Treasury Deputy Inspector General for Audit (“Treasury IG”) reflected the
results of an audit of these strategies to determine how to improve identification of
unreported self-employment taxes (“2007 TIGTA Audit”). 104 As part of the 2007
TIGTA Audit, the Treasury IG reviewed a statistically valid sample of 138 tax-year
returns from 2003 with incomes of $2,000 or more on a Form 1040 Profit or Loss
from Business Schedule C, Profit or Loss from Farming Schedule F, and/or line
twenty-one that contained other income, but that did not include a Schedule SE
reporting SE taxes. 105
Of the 138 returns the Treasury IG reviewed, 52 were selected for audit, 50
audits were completed, 5 were closed with no change, and 12 had been “closed with
little or no examination of the returns.” 106 For the remaining 33 returns (23.91%),
however, the examination averaged an additional SE tax liability of $1,818 per
return. 107 Of the 86 returns that had not been selected for audit, 28 appeared to
have SE tax liabilities (20.29%), averaging an additional SE tax liability of $1,217
per return. 108
C. Estimates for Underreporting of Independent Contractors and On-Demand
Workers Using SIPP
For purposes of developing our estimates on the underpayment of SE tax by
Independent Contractors, we relied on the data developed in the 2007 TIGTA Audit.
Notably, our estimates only approximate the average amount of underpayment of
SE tax on average income for the Independent Contractors we identified using
SIPP. To develop an average underpayment amount we could apply to the earnings
and populations of Independent Contractors, we calculated an average using the
data from the 2007 TIGTA Audit by adding the 33 audited returns with additional
SE tax liability of $1,818 and the 28 returns that appeared to have an estimated
$1,217 underpayment of SE tax liability. This totaled 61 out of 138 returns or 44.2%
of returns that had an underpayment of SE tax. 109 Additionally, we averaged the 33
103

104
105
106
107
108
109

TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., IDENTIFICATION OF UNREPORTED SELF-EMPLOYMENT TAXES CAN
BE IMPROVED 2 (2007).
Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 2.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id.
Id. at 3. An additional 6 returns appeared to have SE tax liabilities exceeding $2,000. Id.
Experts we consulted, including James R. White, former U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
director of tax research on strategic issues, suggested that a rate of 44.2% of returns with underpayment of
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returns averaging $1,818 of additional liability per return with the 28 returns
averaging $1,217 per return to approximate an average underpayment of SE tax
liability of $1,542.
i.

Independent Contractors

To calculate the number of Independent Contractors underreporting SE tax
liability, we started with the collective earnings of this population for 2014, $204.1
billion (based on SIPP), and calculated that the average earnings of these 7.1
million workers were $28,746.48. Further, we calculated that the SE tax owed on
$28,746.48 was $4,398.21, but given that the average underreporting of SE tax
using the 2007 TIGTA report was $1,542, we assumed that where underreporting of
SE tax had occurred, it would be approximately 35.1% of the amount actually owed.
Using the 2007 TIGTA Audit, we derived that an estimated 44.2% of
taxpayers with self-employment income underreported their self-employment
income on their Form 1040; we estimated that 3.1 million Independent Contractors
underreported their SE tax. We then calculated that these 3.1 million Independent
Contractors had average earnings of $28,746.48, translating to collective earnings of
$90.21 billion. The amount of SE tax owed on $90.21 billion was $13.80 billion.
However, given that there is a 35.1% average underreporting of income, we then
estimated that $4.84 billion of SE tax was underreported by Independent
Contractors in 2014 and that approximately $3.92 billion of this amount constituted
underreported Social Security contributions. Table 1 summarizes our estimates.

SE tax was, in fact, too conservative. For example, in 2007, GAO issued a report finding “at least 61% of
sole proprietors underreported their net income by $93.6 billion in 2001.” JAMES R. WHITE, U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TAX GAP: A STRATEGY FOR REDUCING THE GAP SHOULD INCLUDE OPTIONS FOR
ADDRESSING SOLE PROPRIETOR NONCOMPLIANCE 3 (2007).
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Table 1: Estimate of Underpayment of Social Security Contributions for
Independent Contractors Using Treasury Estimates
Total Earnings of Independent Contractors in
2014
Estimated number of Independent
Contractors from SIPP & Average Earnings
2007 TIGTA Audit % of Returns with
Underpayment
2007 TIGTA Audit Average SE Tax
Underpayment
Average Rate of Underpayment
($1,542/$4,398)
Estimated number of Independent
Contractors with Additional SE Tax
Liabilities
Total Earnings of Underreporting
Independent Contractors
SE Tax Owed on Earnings of Underreporting
Independent Contractors
Estimated amount Underreported SE Tax for
Independent Contractors
Estimated amount of Underpayment of Social
Security
ii.

$204.1 Billion
7.1 Million/$28,746.48 Avg.
Earnings
44.2%
$1,542
35.1%
3.1 million (7.1 million x 44.2%)
$90.21 Billion (3.1 million x
$28.746.48)
$13.80 Billion ($90.21 x 15.3%)
$4.84 Billion ($13.80 Billion x
35.1%)
$3.92 Billion ($4.8 Billion x
81.05%) 110

On-Demand Workers

Even though Independent Contractors are often considered major
contributors to the tax gap because they primarily deal in cash, many On-Demand
Workers—particularly those doing On-Platform work—deal extensively in
electronic payment. 111 Often, it depends on how an On-Demand Worker is paid—
electronically, by cash, or by check—and whether they are an On-Platform or OffPlatform Worker that dictates whether (and if) a worker will receive either Form
1099-MISC or Form 1099-K. 112 As previously noted, research and anecdotal
evidence finds that most On-Demand Platforms have adopted the 200/$20K Form
1099-K Filing Threshold for reporting income of On-Platform Workers to the IRS. 113
As a result, many of the largest On-Demand Platforms (for example, Uber,
Etsy, or Airbnb) do not (and are not required to) provide their On-Platform Workers
110

111
112
113

Social Security comprises 12.4% of the 15.3% self-employment tax contribution, or 81.05% of selfemployment tax. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SOCIAL SECURITY & MEDICARE TAX,
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/progdata/taxRates.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2020).
See supra Section I.C.
See BRUCKNER, supra note 1, at 9–10.
See July 2018 Senate Testimony, supra note 9.
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with any Form 1099-K because earnings for On-Demand Platform work, on average,
are below the twenty-thousand dollar annual threshold or On-Platform workers fail
to meet the aggregate 200-transaction test. 114 Academic research has
(conservatively) estimated that, for Airbnb alone, “there is approximately $20
billion of revenue paid to hosts, the bulk of whom likely do not receive a Form 1099K.” 115
In fact, one survey of On-Platform Workers found that in 2015, only 32% of
On-Demand Workers received a Form 1099-K or Form 1099-MISC from their OnDemand Platform. 116 More recently, the California Tax Analysis found that in 2016,
only 12% of the top 100 On-Demand Platforms issued a Form 1099-K to service
providers. 117 This lack of issuance results in, at best, On-Demand Workers
underreporting their income when filing their taxes, and, at worst, failure to file
altogether. 118
While the research on On-Platform Work shows that these workers are less
likely to get a Form 1099 and more likely to misreport their income, taxpayer
industry survey data from 2018 indicates that, generally, self-employed workers
either underreport (32%) or fail to report (36%) their income altogether. 119
Moreover, when there is underreporting of income on U.S household surveys by selfemployed respondents, they underreport by about 30%. 120 These findings are
instructive to building a model to estimate the underpayment and nonpayment of
SE tax by the population of On-Demand Workers we identified using SIPP.
114

115
116

117
118

119
120

Id.; see also Understanding Your Tax Documents, UBER, https://www.uber.com/us/en/drive/taxinformation/tax-documents/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2020) (notifying partners that they will only receive 1099Ks when they meet the 200/$20K Form 1099-K Threshold); Making Sense of Your Tax Form, ETSY (Feb. 21,
2018), https://www.etsy.com/seller-handbook/article/making-sense-of-your-tax-forms/22660467494
(notifying sellers that they will only receive 1099-Ks when they meet the 200/$20K Form 1099-K
Threshold); Should I Expect to Receive a Tax Form from Airbnb?, AIRBNB,
https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/414/should-i-expect-to-receive-a-tax-form-from-airbnb (last visited Oct.
17, 2020) (notifying hosts that they will only receive 1099-Ks when they meet the 200/$20K Form 1099-K
Threshold); JPMCI 2018 STUDY, supra note 2, at 14 (detailing the average monthly earnings for the four
major sectors of the On-Demand Platform economy, which range from a low of $608 (e.g., selling on Etsy) to
a high of $1,736 (e.g., renting a home on Airbnb)). Even if an On-Platform Worker were to work every
month in a year, which is not reflective of what most research indicates On-Platform Workers do, average
income from that On-Platform Work still only ranges from $7,296 to $20,832. But even in those cases where
leasing a room or renting a house would result in $20,832, the requirement of more than 200 transactions
has to be satisfied. In addition, Airbnb’s own research has found that “[t]he average American Airbnb host
over the age of 65 earns $8,350 in supplemental income annually for a single listing.” AIRBNB, HOME
SHARING: A POWERFUL OPTION TO HELP OLDER AMERICANS STAY IN THEIR HOMES 3 (2016),
https://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/livable-communities/livable-documents/documents-2016/AirbnbHomeSharing-OlderAmericans-Report-11-2016.pdf.
Viswanathan, supra note 97, at 317.
BRUCKNER, supra note 1, at 10. The specific survey question asked respondents whether they had received a
Form 1099-MISC or Form 1099-K from the On-Demand Platform they worked with in 2015. Id.
Approximately 32% of respondents reported receiving a Form 1099; 61% reported not receiving a Form 1099
and 6% did not know whether they received a Form 1099. Id.
CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BD., supra note 53, at 14.
See The Sharing Economy: A Taxing Experience for New Entrepreneurs Part I: Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on Small Bus., 114th Cong. 4 (2016) (statement of Caroline Bruckner).
See supra note 28 discussion and accompanying text.
Hurst et al., supra note 27, at 3.
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Specifically, we began with the $35.97 billion of earnings of the On-Demand
Worker population we estimated using SIPP data. 121 Using the taxpayer industry
survey findings discussed in Part I—that only 32% of self-employed workers
properly report their income while 32% underreport and 36% failed to report any
income altogether 122—we assumed that 32% of these earnings were properly
reported for SE tax purposes. This assumption left an approximate gap of $24.46
billion potentially underreported or not reported by On-Demand Workers in 2014.
We then segregated the $24.46 billion into $11.51 billion (or 32%) of underreported
earnings and $12.95 billion (or 36%) of earnings not reported altogether.
From there, we assumed, consistent with research on underreporting rates by
self-employed workers on household surveys, that On-Demand Workers
underreported their earnings by thirty percent. 123 We calculated that this
underreporting would result in an underreporting of $528 million (15.3% SE tax
multiplied by $3.45 billion) and $428 million of Social Security contributions. To
calculate the amount On-Demand Workers failed to contribute altogether, we
multiplied $12.95 billion by the SE tax rate (15.3%) and determined $1.98 billion of
SE tax and $1.61 billion of Social Security contributions went unpaid. 124
Collectively, we estimated that On-Demand Workers failed to contribute $2.51
billion in SE tax and $2.03 billion in Social Security in 2014.

121

122
123
124

As noted earlier, some of the workers we included in the population of On-Demand Workers are OffPlatform Workers, and others may have been employees subject to withholding. This reflects some of the
limitations of using SIPP data to estimate SE tax of On-Platform Workers. To provide context for our SIPP
data estimates, we developed alternative estimates using the 2017 BLS ACW Survey data on Independent
Contractors, as well as the 2017 ACW Gig Economy Supplement and the JPMCI 2018 Data to contextualize
our estimates. See infra Table 3 and accompanying text.
See supra note 28 discussion and accompanying text.
Hurst et al., supra note 27, at 3.
See supra text accompanying note 98.
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Table 2: Estimate of Under- and Nonpayment of Social Security
Contributions for On-Demand Workers Using 2014 SIPP Data
Estimated income from On-Demand
Workers (ODW)
Estimate of the Amount of ODW Earnings
Underreported (32%) and Not Reported
(36%)
Rate of Underreporting of Earnings
Underreporting of SE tax

$35.97 Billion ODW Earnings

Underreporting of Social Security
Contributions
Estimated amount of SE Tax Not Paid by
ODW
Estimated amount of Social Security
contributions Not Paid

$428 Million ($528 Million x 81.05%)

iii.

$11.51 Billion (32% Underreported)
$12.95 Billion (36% Not Reported)
$3.45 Billion ($11.51 Billion x 30%)
$528 Million ($3.45 Billion x 15.3%)

$2.51 Billion ($1.98 Billion + $528
Million)
$2.03 Billion

Alternative Estimates

To provide context for our SIPP data estimates, we also estimated how much
SE tax went underreported by the 10.6 million Independent Contractors identified
in the 2017 BLS ACW Survey. 125 As set forth in Table 3 below, we estimated how
much SE tax went underreported by the 2.3 million On-Platform Workers identified
in the 2017 ACW Gig Economy Supplement as well as the JPMCI 2018 Study and
the 2019 TIGTA Audit. To calculate the Independent Contractor underreporting of
SE tax estimates from the 2017 BLS ACW Survey, we used the 44.2%
underreporting rate of SE tax we derived from the 2007 TIGTA Audit. For the OnPlatform Workers counted in the 2017 ACW Gig Economy Supplement and JPMCI
2018 Study, we assumed that 68% of the workers counted in these estimates did not
receive any Form 1099; then we applied a 63% likelihood of underreporting to our
results. 126 To determine the total number of workers that underreported SE tax
liabilities from the 2019 TIGTA Audit, we used the 25% rate of underreporting
identified in approximately 3.8 million individuals who received a Form 1099-K that
did not report income on a Schedule C or Form 1040 line 21. 127 We then used the

125
126

127

BLS ACW 2017 SURVEY, supra note 72, at 6.
We believe 68% to be a reasonable assumption because it is consistent with prior survey data specifically
asking respondents working with On-Demand Platforms whether they received any Form 1099 for their
On-Platform work. An alternative is to rely on the data from the California Tax Analysis that found that
only 12% of the Top 100 Platforms in 2016 issued 1099-Ks; however, the California Tax Analysis does not
consider whether Form 1099-MISCs were issued instead of Form 1099-K. See supra text accompanying note
53.
See supra text accompanying notes 59–60.
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average underreporting amount of $1,542 we derived from the 2007 TIGTA Audit to
estimate a collective amount of unreported SE tax liabilities.
Similar to using SIPP data to derive estimates of SE tax underpayment for
Independent Contractors and On-Demand Workers, there are limitations with
using alternative measures of independent workers or On-Platform Workers. For
example, the number of On-Platform Workers included in the JPMCI 2018 Study
includes workers who earned income from rental activities not likely subject to SE
tax. 128 Additionally, we did not have the collective earnings of these populations, so
we used an alternative methodology to illustrate underreporting. This alternative
methodology did not consider how much income these workers failed to contribute
to SE tax altogether. If we included non-reported amounts of income, then the
estimates would likely be significantly higher, but we erred on the side of caution
and assumed that the workers who misreported their income merely underreported
their SE tax by $1,542 rather than failed to contribute altogether. These results are
set forth in Table 3.

128

See supra note 34 discussion.
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Table 3: Comparison of Estimates of Underpayment of SE Tax and Social
Security Contributions BLS 2017 ACW Survey Data
Summary of
Data Sets and
Estimates of
Underreporting

Independent
Contractors
BLS 2017
ACW Survey

OnPlatform
Workers
2017 ACW
Gig
Economy
Supplement

JPMCI
2018
Study of
OnPlatform
Workers

2019 TIGTA
Report on Gig
Economy

Total # of
Workers

10,600,000

1,600,000

2,300,000

3,779,329
(Includes
Forms for TY
2012-2016)

Total # of
Workers
Underreporting
SE Tax
Liabilities

4,685,200
(10.6M x
44.2%)

685,400
(1.6M x 68%
x 63%)

1,564,000
(2.3M x
68% x
63%)

812,018
(25% of gig
workers who
received 1099-K
and didn’t
report on
Schedule C or
Line 21)

Total Amount of
SE Tax
Underreported
($1,542)

$7.22 Billion

$1.05 Billion

$1.5
Billion

$1.25B

Total Amount of
Underreported
Social Security
Contribution

$5.85 Billion

$856 Million

$1.2
Billion

$1 Billion

V. DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE SIPP DATA INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR AND ONDEMAND WORKFORCE, AND THE EFFECTS OF UNDERPAYMENT ON SOCIAL
SECURITY BENEFITS
As noted earlier, this Article seeks not only to quantify the impact of
Independent Contractors’ and On-Demand Workers’ likely underpayment of SE tax
and Social Security contributions but also to consider the implications of these
underpayments in terms of what it means for these workers’ Social Security
benefits. Important groundwork has already been completed and some research has
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already considered the economic security of U.S. On-Demand Workers and what
this work means for these workers’ retirement. 129
For example, a 2015 International Labour Office survey of Amazon
Mechanical Turk and Crowdflower workers in the United States and India found
that most of the U.S. workers on those platforms, who use platform work as their
main source of income, “lack [S]ocial [S]ecurity coverage . . . a mere 8.1% of main job
crowdworkers, in the [United States], report making regular contributions to a
private retirement account and only 9.4% contribute to [S]ocial [S]ecurity, raising
concerns about the financial situation of these workers when they reach retirement
age.” 130 Moreover, other critical research on the retirement issues facing OnDemand Workers has confirmed the reality that since most On-Demand Platforms
classify their workers as Independent Contractors, those workers “are
approximately two-thirds less likely than standard employees to have access to an
employer-provided retirement plan.” 131
SIPP-collected demographic information provides a unique opportunity to
consider the impact of the failure to contribute to Social Security and other
retirement security issues of Independent Contractors and On-Demand Workers
beyond their earnings. Estimates on the demographics of these workforces range—
again depending on how these workers are defined.
For example, in a 2015 report, GAO found that Independent Contractors—
including On-Demand Workers—more often appear to be younger and Hispanic
than any other age, race, or ethnicity. 132 However, MBO Partners, in its 2019
report, described the average Independent Contractor as more likely to be male
than female. 133 The JPMCI 2018 Study confirmed a number of these findings—
particularly with respect to those On-Platform Workers earning income in the
transportation sector, which is by far the largest sector of the On-Demand Economy,
when it concluded that the majority of On-Platform Workers were men working as
rideshare drivers. 134 However, this same study found that there were more women
than men in each of the other sectors (i.e., non-transport work, selling, and leasing),
but relative to transportation, those other sectors were a small portion of the OnDemand Economy. 135
129
130

131

132
133
134
135

See generally Berg, supra note 13, at 563−69 (discussing an international comparison to the underreported
income that was not taxed towards social security and the detrimental effects it can have on workers).
Id. at 563. Crowdwork is a kind of work performed remotely on an online platform where workers perform
“micro-tasks” and are paid for singular tasks in response to business’ posts via platforms. Id. at 545. Typical
categories of tasks include researching information on the internet, verifying tweets, completing academic
surveys, and gaining content access. Id.
Secunda, supra note 13, at 436. Secunda’s article is the first to argue that On-Demand Workers be treated
as common-law employees for retirement purposes to qualify for ERISA purposes. Id. at 437.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 65, at 5.
MBO 2019 REPORT, supra note 4, at 7.
JPMCI 2018 STUDY, supra note 2, at 22.
Id. Going forward, it will be interesting to see what happens with the transportation sector of the OnDemand Economy with the advent of driverless cars, which may be years away. See generally Hyperdrive,
The State of the Self-Driving Car Race 2020, BLOOMBERG (May 15, 2020, 5:00 AM),
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A. SIPP Demographic Data on Independent Contractors and On-Demand
Workers

Using SIPP, as displayed in Figure 1, we estimated that Baby Boomers or
individuals aged 55 and over (50.68%) in 2014 were more often Independent
Contractors, followed by Generation X or individuals aged 34 to 54 (26.06%) and
Millennials aged 18 to 33 (23.36%) in 2014. We found that Independent Contractors
were more likely to be women (55.88%) than men (44.12%), as displayed in Figure
2. And we found that Independent Contractors were most often white (67.47%),
then Hispanic/Latinx (14.57%), black (12.39%), and Asian (5.65%) as shown in
Figure 3.

Figure 1: SIPP Independent Contractors in 2014
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23.26%
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Figure 2: SIPP Independent Contractors By Gender, in 2014
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https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2020-self-driving-car-race/ (listing companies that are developing
driverless cars and how close those companies are to success).
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Figure 3:SIPP Independent Contractors By Race/Ethncity 2014
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With respect to the population of On-Demand Workers we identified using
SIPP, displayed in Figure 4, we found that Generation X (45.40%) was more often
engaged as On-Demand Workers than Baby Boomers (36.82%) and Millennials
(17.78%). Additionally, we found that On-Demand Workers were slightly more
likely to be women (51.81%) than men (48.18%) (Figure 5). Finally, we found that
On-Demand Workers were most often white (67.03%), followed by Hispanic/Latinx
(20.45%), black (9.74%), and then Asian (2.73%) as shown in Figure 6.
Figure 4: SIPP On-Demand Workers By Age in 2014
Millennials (18-33)

17.78%
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Figure 5: SIPP On-Demand Workers By Sex, in 2014
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Figure 6: SIPP On-Demand Workers By Race/Ethncity 2014
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These results are somewhat consistent with readily available data from at
least one On-Demand Platform—Airbnb. In a March 2016 report detailing Airbnb’s
growing population of women hosts over sixty years old, Airbnb researchers found
that seniors are the best rated and fastest growing demographic of Airbnb hosts in
the United States, and the majority of women hosting on Airbnb are “empty nesters
looking to make ends meet.” 136 More recently, in March 2018, Airbnb touted its
success with helping D.C. senior hosts to age in their homes. 137 Our SIPP analysis
of On-Demand Workers indicates that they older than most other estimates suggest
and are slightly more likely to be women. Apart from rental income, which is
generally not subject to SE tax, earnings of On-Demand Workers could have a large
impact on their receipt of Social Security benefits.
B. Implications for Social Security Benefits
Social Security benefits are based on a worker’s earning history and age at
retirement and are designed to “replace part of a worker’s earnings.” 138 A worker is
eligible for Social Security after they work in Social Security-covered employment
for ten or more years (i.e., forty earnings credits or four credits per year). 139
In 2020, self-employed individuals earn one credit for every $1,410 of
earnings, up to the maximum four work credits for $5,640 in earnings that can be
earned in one year. 140 Additionally, a worker’s initial monthly benefit is based on
their thirty-five highest years of earnings, which are indexed to historical wage
growth. 141 The thirty-five highest years of indexed earnings are divided by thirtyfive to determine the worker’s career-average annual earnings. 142 The resulting
amount is divided by twelve to determine the worker’s average indexed monthly
136
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139
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141
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AIRBNB, WOMEN HOSTS, supra note 7, at 2. However, most rental income is not subject to SE tax and would
not be included in calculating Social Security benefits. See supra note 34 discussion.
See AIRBNB, D.C. SENIORS, supra note 7, at 2.
HUSTON, supra note 11, at 7.
Id. at 8.
SOC. SEC. ADMIN., Pub. No. 05-10022, IF YOU ARE SELF-EMPLOYED (2020).
See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., Social Security Benefit Amounts, https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/Benefits.html
(last visited Nov. 30, 2020).
Id.
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earnings (AIME). 143 Workers with fewer than thirty-five years of earnings in
covered employment or years of no earnings have zeroes entered in the
computation, resulting in a lower AIME and, therefore, a lower monthly benefit. 144
The Social Security benefit is progressive in that “[i]t provides workers with
low lifetime earnings a benefit that represents a higher percentage of their preretirement income than higher-income workers. However, benefits are proportional
to average lifetime earnings, and for workers with lower lifetime earnings[, such as
women], benefits calculated under the regular formula will . . . be . . . low.” 145 This
exacerbates existing challenges for women: in 2015, the average benefit for women
was $14,184, compared to $18,000 for men. 146 Often, women take time out of the
workforce to care for family, and as a result, do not earn credits toward their Social
Security benefits during that time and have a lower AIME. 147
At the same time, academic research has resoundingly concluded that women
are “more economically vulnerable” than men in retirement because women retire
with less retirement savings, assets, and Social Security benefits than men, despite
women tending to live longer and having more healthcare costs. 148 In addition, “[f]or
all but the highest–income families, Social Security provides the largest source of
retirement income.” 149 For women in particular, Social Security income, as modest
as it may be on average, is the only income keeping nearly half of women sixty-five
and older from poverty. 150
C. Implications for Social Security Solvency
Given Social Security's critical role in helping so many beneficiaries avoid
poverty, our estimate of the $5.95 billion in unpaid Social Security contributions—
likely a result of Independent Contractors and On-Demand Workers' approximately
$7.35 billion in underpaid self-employment taxes in 2014—merits additional
analysis. Such additional analysis will focus on how the unpaid contributions
impact the solvency of Social Security.
Social Security faces long-term financing difficulties. In its most recent report
(“2020 Trustees’ Report”), the Social Security Trustees projected the program cost
for 2020 “to be less than total income by about $4 billion and exceed non-interest
income by about $73 billion.” 151 Additionally, the 2020 Trustees’ Report estimates
143
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HUSTON, supra note 11, at 8.
Joan Entmacher & Amy Matsui, Addressing the Challenges Women Face in Retirement: Improving Social
Security, Pensions, and SSI, 46 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 749, 754 (2013).
Stan-Hinden, Women and Social Security Benefits, AARP (Feb. 2017), https://www.aarp.org/work/socialsecurity/info-2014/women-and-social-security-benefits.html.
Id.
Etmacher & Matsui, supra note 145, at 749.
Id. at 750.
Id. at 751.
THE BD. OF TRUSTEES, THE 2020 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND
SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND FEDERAL DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS 2 (2020).
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that the trust funds currently have enough in reserves to sufficiently pay program
costs over the next ten years. 152 However, the most recent estimates do not reflect
the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. 153
Using SIPP, we estimated approximately $3.92 billion in underpayment of
Social Security contributions from Independent Contractors and $2.03 billion in
underpayment and nonpayment from On-Demand Workers in 2014. Historically,
government research on sole proprietors has shown high rates of underreporting of
their income—even higher than we used in calculating our estimates. 154 And while
that research may precede the advent of the On-Demand Economy, the data we
used from SIPP might, too. The On-Demand Economy has grown substantially since
2014 and added millions of workers in the last four years, who may not have been
captured by our SIPP data. 155 In addition, our estimates for underpayment of SE
tax of Independent Contractors are based on averages of underpayment of SE tax
and do not account for the likely nonpayment of tax by this population altogether.
As a result, we suspect that our estimates are conservative as to the regular
underpayment of SE tax by Independent Contractors and On-Demand Workers,
particularly with respect to those On-Platform Workers we included, the majority of
whom will not receive any Form 1099 to prompt proper reporting of their income. 156
Moreover, with respect to the Off-Platform Workers we included in our On-Demand
Workers estimates, we note that innovations in terms of digitizing payments
suggest that more Off-Platform Workers are (and will be) paid in ways not subject
to information reporting under current law. 157
Even the most robust research on the size, scope, and earnings of OnDemand Economy workers concedes that new payment options could involve
bypassing a bank account entirely, potentially resulting in undercounting
participants in the On-Demand Platform Economy. 158 Even with the foregoing
qualifications, we find that there is, at the very least, an annual $7.35 billion in
underpayment of SE tax by these workers. This underpayment should be addressed
to shore up the overall solvency of Social Security and ensure that workers’ AIME is
properly calculated.
VI.POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
As part of its recommendations for shoring up the long-term financing of
Social Security, the 2020 Trustees’ Report recommends that “lawmakers address
152
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155
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Id.
Id.
See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 109.
See supra Part II.
See supra Section I.C.
See Ryan Browne, Digital Payments Expected to Hit 726 Billion by 2020—But Cash Isn’t Going Anywhere
Yet, CNBC (Oct. 9, 2017, 6:46 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/09/digital-payments-expected-to-hit-726billion-by-2020-study-finds.html (quoting private sector report finding “non-cash transactions between 2014
and 2015 rose 11.2 percent, the highest growth of the past decade.”).
JPMCI 2018 STUDY, supra note 2, at 9.
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the projected trust fund shortfalls in a timely way in order to phase in necessary
changes gradually and give workers and beneficiaries time to adjust to them.” 159 To
facilitate tax administration and compliance, assist independent contractors
generally, and aid On-Platform service providers and sellers specifically, Congress
needs to take additional action to modernize information reporting requirements,
update quarterly-estimated filing due dates, and require IRS developed tax
guidance that On-Demand Platforms can provide to service providers and sellers as
part of the onboarding process.
A. Align the Form 1099-MISC and 1099-K Reporting Thresholds
Academic research shows that, under certain circumstances, enhanced
information reporting can reduce the tax gap. 160 In fact, “the degree to which
taxpayers fail to include income on their tax returns, or underreport, is directly
related to the extent these income items are subject to information reporting.” 161
Given the current practice adopted by the majority of On-Demand Platforms to use
the 200/$20K Form 1099-K Reporting Threshold for furnishing Form 1099-Ks to
On-Platform Workers:
Congress should move forward with modernizing the information
reporting regime by lowering the filing threshold for Form 1099-K to
[$1,000 and limiting the aggregate 200 transaction threshold]. At the
same time, Congress should update the Form 1099-MISC threshold by
raising it from $600 to [$1,000] to provide some relief for small
businesses who are subject to the Form 1099-MISC filing rules [for the
independent contractors they hire]. Keep in mind, the Form 1099MISC filing thresholds have not been fundamentally reviewed or
updated since at least 1954. Adjusted for inflation, $600 in 1954 would
be more than $5,000 in today’s dollars. 162
By creating a uniform standard for reporting of self-employment income,
Congress would limit the “tax opportunism” some On-Demand Platforms have

159
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162

THE BD. OF TRUSTEES, supra note 151, at 5.
Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap: When is Information Reporting
Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1733, 1733, 1736 (2010) (noting increased information reporting is not a
“panacea” and that increased reporting imposes costs); see also Viswanathan, supra note 97, at 283
(explaining how absent legislative intervention, On-Demand Platforms “pose a critical threat to the
reporting system underlying domestic and international tax compliance.”).
Viswanathan, supra note 97, at 288.
July 2018 Senate Testimony, supra note 9, at 30 (footnotes omitted).
H.R. 3717 takes the approach of aligning the Form 1099 threshold filing requirements at $1,500,
among other tax changes targeted to small business. Other bills, notably, S. 1549, would align
the thresholds at $1,000. S. 1549 goes further and includes other provisions on misclassification
and provides for voluntary withholding agreements to be instituted between platforms and their
service providers and sellers.
Id. n.19.
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engaged in by adopting the 200/$20,000 Form 1099-K Reporting Threshold. 163
Congress is generally aware of the budgetary impact this proposal would have and
how it could translate to increased federal revenues. As part of its 2017 tax reform
debate work, the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) provided a score for a version
of this proposal that would align the Form 1099-MISC and Form 1099-K at $1,000
and estimated that it could raise as much as approximately $3.6 billion over a tenyear budget window. 164
[In addition,] Congress is likely to enhance compliance by both
taxpayers and reporting entities because more taxpayers will receive
Form 1099s, which is . . . supported by the existing research on tax
compliance and information reporting . . . . Some states have already
moved forward with this approach and aligned the 1099-K and 1099MISC reporting thresholds at the current 1099-MISC level of $600
with positive results. 165
B. Update Quarterly Estimated Payment Due Dates
As noted earlier,
when self-employed taxpayers are expected to owe at least $1,000 in
taxes and are not subject to withholding, advance payments of
estimated tax are due to the IRS throughout the year in the form of
quarterly-estimated payments. It just doesn’t take that much income
to trip over these filing requirements. 166
Moreover, research on the tax compliance of On-Demand Platform workers
indicated that more than one-third of respondents did not know whether they were
required to file quarterly estimated payments on the income they earned working
with a platform. 167
The former IRS National Taxpayer Advocate repeatedly recommended that
anything that can be done “to help taxpayers make their estimated tax payments
more easily and lessen the burden of saving to make such payments is likely to
increase compliance.” 168 In order to facilitate tax compliance and ease taxpayer
burden, Congress should update the filing deadlines for second- and third-quarter
163
164

165
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See generally Can Sharing Be Taxed?, supra note 8, at 1032–45.
Joint Comm. on Taxation, Estimated Revenue Effects of the Chairman's Mark of the "Tax Cuts And Jobs
Act," Scheduled for Markup by the Committee on Finance on November 13, 2017 (JCX-52-17) (Nov. 9. 2017),
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=5033.
July 2018 Senate Testimony, supra note 9, at 30. “In 2017 both Vermont and Massachusetts began to
require information reporting for income earned by small business on-demand platform operators and paid
electronically at the current 1099-MISC threshold of $600. According to the industry experts, the lower
reporting threshold in Massachusetts ‘catapulted reporting by over 100%.’” Id. n.20.
Id. at 30 (footnote omitted).
The Sharing Economy: Part I, supra note 8, at 25.
The Sharing Economy: A Taxing Experience for New Entrepreneurs: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Small
Bus., 113th Cong. 10 (2016) (statement of Nina Olson, IRS National Taxpayer Advocate).
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installment payments set forth in IRC § 6654(c) to be due two weeks after a
quarter’s end, rather than in the middle of a quarter as is required under current
law. 169
A bipartisan small-business tax bill proposed by the leadership of the U.S.
House of Representatives Small Business Committee (H.R. 3717) in 2017 does just
that and modernizes the existing filing deadlines to reflect the business reality of
the second and third quarters’ ends. 170 This change is likely to increase compliance
because under current law, “[t]axpayers must remember oddly spaced payment
dates . . . [that] do not consistently coincide with calendar quarters, making it
difficult to calculate net income and confusing to taxpayers.” 171 By simply changing
existing due dates to fall after a quarter’s end, Congress can ease the burdensome
process of estimating income for purposes of remitting quarterly estimated
payments because taxpayers will actually know how much they earned the
preceding quarter rather than requiring taxpayers to make their best guess.
C. Require the IRS to Develop and Publish Guidance for On-Demand
Platforms to Provide Service Providers and Sellers as Part of the
Onboarding Process.
Survey data of experienced On-Platform Workers show a significant
knowledge gap between what taxpayers understand their tax obligations to be, if
any, and what they actually are. 172 “[M]any [on-demand] platforms are hesitant to
provide tax information to their service providers and sellers due to ongoing
concerns and litigation over misclassification issues. To address the knowledge gap,
the National Taxpayer Advocate has recommended the IRS develop a checklist for
first-time, self-employed on-demand economy workers and sellers.” 173 Anecdotal and
survey evidence suggest that taxpayers want to do the right thing:
[They] are unfamiliar with the requirements of quarterly estimated
payments. By the time taxpayers learn that they have failed to file
quarterly estimated payments on this income, many just walk away
and fail to file altogether. By developing accessible content that [OnDemand] platforms can distribute to service providers and sellers as
part of the onboarding process, the IRS can make immediate progress
in addressing the knowledge gap that even experienced, self-employed
small business owners have. 174
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Small Business Owners’ Tax Simplification Act of 2017, H.R. 3717, 115th Cong. (2017).
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CONCLUSION
This Article intends to shed light on the Social Security implications of the
current federal tax rules for self-employed, non-employer workers working outside
of a traditional employment relationship, as well as self-employed individuals who
work in occupations that occur in the On-Demand Economy. Such implications are
ascertained by estimating the population and earnings of these workers using the
U.S. Census Bureau’s redesigned Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP). Ultimately, we estimated there were 7.1 million Independent Contractors
and 3.1 million On-Demand Workers earning self-employment income in 2014. 175
These workers are likely to have failed to contribute as much as $7.35 billion in SE
tax in 2014, which translates to at least $5.95 billion in underpaid Social Security
contributions.
The research measuring these workers is dynamic, but there appears to be
consensus that On-Demand Workers represent a population that is hard to measure
in terms of size, composition, and earnings. However, even with conservative
estimates on the underpayment of SE tax, there remains a significant—potentially
multi-billion-dollar—probability that millions of the workers we estimated are not
paying into Social Security. This a particularly acute problem for women, who tend
to have greater dependency on Social Security and lower contributions over the
course of their working lives. This problem will continue to grow along with the
digitizing of the cash economy. Although Congress has limited options, it can try to
modernize information reporting, update quarterly estimated payment
requirements, and require distribution of tax guidance to help address these issues
and further support the solvency of Social Security.
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METHODOLOGY
For preparing the estimates included in this Article, we extrapolated data
from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)
on populations of workers we identified as Independent Contractors and OnDemand Workers, including the overall number of workers in these groups and
their collective earnings. We then surveyed academic literature and existing
National Bureau of Economy Research, U.S. Department of Treasury, and IRS
reports on: (1) the tax gap, (2) underreporting and underpayment of selfemployment taxes, and (3) tax compliance surveys of workers using On-Demand
Platforms for selling goods and services. We also relied on 2018 tax-preparer
industry survey data on the under- and nonreporting of income by self-employed
workers.
To develop an average underpayment amount we could apply to the
population of Independent Contractors and On-Demand Workers, we analyzed data
from the 2007 TIGTA Audit to determine that: (1) 44.2% of returns that TIGTA
included in its statistically valid sample reported Schedule C or Schedule F income
but did not include a Schedule SE and had an underpayment of SE tax; and (2) the
average underpayment of self-employment tax liability was $1,542. The 2007
TIGTA data is relevant because it was (at the time of publication) the only recent
methodology available from TIGTA on the underpayment of SE Tax. We adopted
this methodology for use in this exercise not to be definitive or exact but rather as
an illustrative and fairly representative measure of existing tax audits on the
underreporting of SE Tax.
To calculate the number and amount of Independent Contractors
underreporting self-employment tax liability, we used the following assumptions:
44.2% of the 7.1 million Independent Contractors we identified using SIPP
underreported their SE tax liability on their 2014 Form 1040s, on average, by
$1,542. We also assumed the collective earnings of this population of $204.1 billion
translated to $28,746.48 of earnings on average, and that the average
underpayment of SE tax on these earnings was 35.1%. We calculated this would
result in $4.84 billion in additional SE tax that should have been collected on this
income in 2014, and that approximately $3.92 billion of this amount is
underreported Social Security contributions. To compare our results with more
recent data sets, we ran a variation of these calculations using the 10.6 million
Independent Contractor population from the 2017 BLS ACW Survey. This
calculation assumed that 44.2% of that population underreported their earnings by
$1,542.
With respect to our estimates for On-Demand Workers, because our
population data was likely over-inclusive and our earnings data was under
representative, we calculated our estimates using the total SIPP earnings data of
On-Demand Workers, and then assumed that: (1) 32% of those earnings were
properly reported, (2) 32% of those earnings were underreported by 30%, and (3)
36% of the collective earnings went unreported altogether.
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With respect to the 2.3 million On-Platform Workers identified in the JPMCI
2018 Study and the 1.6 million On-Platform Workers identified in the 2017 ACW
Gig Economy Supplement, we assumed that: (1) 68% of On-Demand Workers did
not receive a Form 1099-K or Form 1099-MISC for their self-employment income,
and (2) 63% of the population of On-Demand Workers that did not receive any Form
1099 misreported their income. For the 2019 TIGTA Audit estimate, we used
812,081 (25%) of the approximately 3.8 million workers who received a Form 1099K but did not report income on a Schedule C or Line 21. We then multiplied the
average SE tax underpayment of $1,542 to those populations to calculate the total
underreported SE tax and Social Security Contribution.
Research Question(s):
1) Using SIPP, how many individuals are freelance, independent contractors,
and self-employed individuals (“Independent Contractors”)?
2) Using SIPP, how many workers are using on-demand, app-based platforms,
or are working in occupations that occur in the On-Demand Economy (“OnDemand Workers”)?
3) Using SIPP, how much income was earned by Independent Contractors and
On-Demand Workers?
4) How much SE tax should have been collected on this income?
5) What was the Social Security underpayment amount from this income?
6) What are the Social Security implications for these workers and the solvency
for Social Security?
About the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)
To prepare the estimates in this Article, we used the U.S. Census Bureau’s
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). SIPP is a longitudinal, multipanel survey of adults in the United States. Each panel features a nationally
representative sample interviewed over a multi-year period lasting approximately
two and a half to four years. The size of the sample ranges from 14,000 to 52,000
households. In comparison to other nationally representative surveys, SIPP fills the
gaps that other surveys such as the Current Population Survey (CPS) leave by
providing data that affords a better understanding and analyses of the distribution
of income, wealth, and poverty in the United States and of the effects of federal and
state programs on the well-being of families and individuals.
The core questions cover demographic characteristics, labor force
participation, program participation, and amounts and types of earned and
unearned income received including transfer payments and noncash benefits from
various programs and asset ownership. Additionally, SIPP is larger than
comparable surveys such as the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and provides
information on business ownership that is not found in surveys such as the SCF.
With respect to labor and earnings questions, SIPP collects information about
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an individual’s work history from the beginning of the reference year through the
interview month. Specifically,
Topics covered include the weeks of employment, amount and type(s)
of earnings, and business characteristics. For respondents with a
period time not working, SIPP collects data on the reasons why the
respondent did not hold a job, and whether the respondent looked for
work. Basic information about the job such as beginning and ending
dates, the type of work arrangement, and reason for the job ending
(when applicable) are collected first. The next questions are
characteristics of the job/business such as industry, occupation, union
status, the number of employees, and incorporation status. Next the
survey asks about the types of earnings the respondent received
(wage/salary, commission, tips, overtime or bonus), the amounts
earned, and the number of hours worked per week. Finally, the survey
asks respondents to report any time they were away from the job
without pay within the reported job spell. For those periods where the
respondent was not employed, information is collected about the labor
force status of the respondent during that period. This includes
information about why they were not working, unpaid work in a family
business or farm, time spent on layoff and time spent looking for work.
The 2014 Panel allows respondents to report detailed information for
up to seven jobs and up to three periods of time away without pay.
Respondents may report up to two changes in wage/salary pay rate
and hours worked for each job over the reference period. 176
Variables Used:
EJB1_JBORSE through EJB7_JBORSE:
Description: This variable describes the type of work arrangement, whether work
for an employer, self-employed or other.
• Universe Description: Respondents who held a job during the reference
month.
TJB1_EMPALL through TJB7_EMPALL:
Description: About how many people are employed by ... at ALL LOCATIONS
together?
• Universe Description: Respondents who had a job or a definite work
arrangement and their employer operated in more than one location during
the reference period.
TJB1_EMPB through TJB7_EMPB:
Description: What is the maximum number of employees, including ..., working for
... at any given time?
176

SIPP Content, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/sipp/about/sipp-contentinformation.html#par_abstract_7 (last updated Apr. 23, 2019).
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Universe Description: Respondents who were self-employed during the
reference period.
TJB1_OCC through TJB7_OCC:
Description: Occupation code Universe
• Description: Respondents who worked for an employer, were self-employed,
or had another work arrangement.
•

Despite its advantages, SIPP has its limitations. As with most survey data,
SIPP data is self-reported, which can be problematic for the reporting of selfemployment, income received from a particular source, and payment of taxes. In
addition, the SIPP data on self-employment does not specifically identify
individuals who earn income working with On-Demand Platforms. Instead, we have
identified individuals with occupations occurring in the On-Demand Economy as
reflected by their SIPP survey responses. To provide additional context for the SIPP
data, we also included the most recent data collected in connection with the 2017
BLS ACW Survey as well as the JPMCI 2018 Study.

